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The Standard of Correctness and the Ontology of Depiction
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops Richard Wollheim’s claim that the proper appreciation of a picture involves not
only enjoying a seeing-in experience but also abiding by a standard of correctness. While scholars have
so far focused on what fixes the standard, thereby discussing the alternative between intentions and
causal mechanisms, the paper focuses on what the standard does, that is, establishing which kinds,
individuals, features and standpoints are relevant to the understanding of pictures. It is argued that,
while standards concerning kinds, individuals and features can be relevant also to ordinary perception,
standards concerning standpoints are specific to pictorial experience. Drawing on all this, the paper
proposes  an  ontology  of  depiction  according  to  which  a  picture  is  constituted  by  both  its  visual
appearance and its standard of correctness.
TEXT
What  is  a  picture?  Experience-based  theories  of  depiction  (e.g.  Wollheim  1980,  Hopkins  1998)
conceive  of  pictures  as  marked  surfaces  that  elicit  a  sui  generis perceptual  experience.  Likewise,
according to recognitional theories (e.g.  Schier 1986, Lopes 1996), a picture is a marked surface that
triggers perceptual recognition of its subject from a suitable viewer. Experience-based theories and
recognitional theories cast pictures as artifacts whose function consists in eliciting a sort of second-
hand perception which, borrowing Richard Wollheim’s (1980) expression, one might call “seeing-in”. 
Still, as acknowledged by both experience-based theorists and recognitional theorists, seeing-in cannot
be the whole story.  There is another element that essentially contributes to depiction.  This is what
Wollheim (1980) calls “the standard of correctness”, that is, the norm that seeing-in should abide by in
order to count as an appropriate appreciation of what is depicted. While seeing-in is elicited by the
picture’s appearance, the standard of correctness is established by the picture’s history.
Much theoretical effort has been devoted so far to figure out seeing-in while the standard of correctness
has been discussed almost exclusively with respect to the distinction between intentional and causal
factors. Specifically, scholars tend to trace the standard of correctness back to two sources: the maker’s
intentions in the case of handmade pictures, and causal mechanisms in the case of photographs (see
Newall 2011a and 2011b, pp. 55-61). However, intentions also can contribute to fix the standard for
photographs (see Hopkins 1998, pp. 71-77), as well as causal mechanisms can help to fix standard for
handmade pictures (see Lopes 1996, pp. 164-165).
In the first part of this paper (sections 1-4), I will highlight a more basic distinction, which concerns
what the standard of correctness does rather than what fixes it. This is the distinction between four
different  ways  in  which  the  standard  of  correctness  can  operate,  namely,  with  respect  to  kinds,
individuals, standpoints, and features. I will dub them the kind-standard, the individual-standard, the
standpoint-standard,  and the feature-standard.  I will  elucidate them thereby building up a thorough
account of the standard of correctness.
In the second part of the paper (sections 5-8), I will draw on the notion of standard of correctness in
order to propose an ontology of depiction, that is, a fully fledged answer to the question “what is a
picture?”. Specifically, I will argue that a picture is an artifact which is constituted by both its marked
surface and its standard of correctness. While the marked surface plays the role of material constituent,
the standard of correctness rather plays the role of constitutive norm.
1. Individuals and Kinds
As pointed out by Wollheim (1980), the visual experience elicited by a picture, namely seeing-in, is
necessary but not sufficient for an appropriate appreciation of the picture. The reason is that seeing-in
only provides us with a visual appearance that might correspond to several things. Thus, in order to
properly appreciate a picture, one needs to pick out what is depicted among the various things that one
can  see  in  that  marked  surface.  Here  is  where  the  standard  of  correctness  enters  the  picture.  As
Wollheim (1980,  p.  137)  puts  it,  “What  the standard does  is  to  select  the  correct  perception of  a
representation out of possible perceptions of it”. 
Still, Wollheim’s characterization faces two issues. First, it presupposes some conceptual penetration of
perception, so that a grasping of the standard can change the perception of what is depicted. However,
it is controversial whether perception can be conceptually penetrated, and thus it would be better to
avoid  such  presupposition  (see  Firestone  and  Scholl  2016).  A more  neutral  formulation  is  thus
preferable,  according to  which  what  the  standard  does  is  to  select  the  correct  understanding of  a
representation  out  of  possible  understandings of  it.  While  seeing-in  provides  us  with  a  bundle  of
possible understandings of a picture, the standard of correctness allows us to select the correct one out
of them.
Secondly,  Wollheim focuses  almost  exclusively on  what  I  have  dubbed  “individual-standard”  and
“kind-standard”, thereby underestimating the “standpoint-standard” and the “feature-standard”. In fact,
focusing on what  he  says  on individuals  and kinds  can help  us  to  see both the  strengths  and the
limitations of his account. 
Wollheim (1980, p. 138) begins with observing that  the standard “applies both to representations of
particular things and to the representations of things of a particular kind”. Then, as a paradigmatic
kind-standard,  he  considers  “a  certain  sixteenth-century  engraving,  ascribed  to  a  follower  of
Marcantonio” in which “some art-historians have seen a dog curled up asleep at the feet of a female
saint”, and yet “Closer attention to the subject, and to the print itself, will show the spectator that the
animal is a lamb” (1980, p. 138). Lastly, as a paradigmatic individual-standard, he mentions “Holbein’s
famous portrait in three-quarters view”, observing that “I normally see Henry VIII. However, I may
have been going to too many old movies recently, and I look at the portrait and, instead of seeing Henry
VIII, I now find myself seeing Charles Laughton” (1980, p. 138). 
Both the individual-standard and the kind-standard are fixed by the picture’s history and constrain the
viewer’s experience. As Wollheim (1980, p. 138) points out: “In each of these two cases there is a
standard which says that one of the perceptions is correct and the other incorrect, this standard goes
back to the intentions of the unknown engraver or of Holbein, and, in so far as I set myself to look at
the representation as a representation, I must try to get my perception to conform to this standard”.
Specifically, in the the sixteenth-century engraving, the kind-standard establishes that what the viewer
sees in the picture belongs to the kind “lamb”, not to the kind “dog”, while in Holbein’s portrait, the
individual-standard establishes that the individual to be seen in the picture is Henry VIII, not Charles
Laughton.
While the individual-standard often needs to be explicitly stated since our knowledge of individuals is
necessarily limited, the kind-standard usually remains implicit in practice since identification of kinds
such as human being or tree or star are part of the basic knowledge we share as members of our form of
life. Yet, the fact that the standard is obvious and taken for granted does not mean that there is no
standard. If one imaginarily shifts the context, the hidden standard can show up. Let us consider, for
instance, a hypothetical alien viewer who lacks the concept of a certain kind thereby failing to correctly
understand a painting which portray an individual of that kind. In fact, we can find ourselves in a
similar situation when we face pictures of things whose kinds we find it hard to detect. Susan Sontag
(1977, pp. 71-72) offers a couple of interesting examples of the situation in which the kind-standard
can no longer be taken for granted: “The subject of Weston’s ‘Cabbage Leaf,’ taken in 1931, looks like
a fall of gathered cloth; a title is needed to identify it. [...] What looks like a bare coronet—the famous
photograph taken by Harold Edgerton in 1936—becomes far more interesting when we find out it is a
splash of milk”. Wollheim’s above mentioned example of the sixteenth-century engraving that seems to
portray  a  dog  but  in  fact  portrays  a  lamb  provides  us  with  an  analogous  case  in  the  domain  of
handmade pictures.i
At this  point,  one might  wonder  whether  any picture  has  both an individual-standard and a  kind-
standard.  That  sounds  too  demanding.  For  many  pictures,  the  individual-standard  seems  to  be
dispensable. An appropriate experience of Francisco Goya’s “The Third of  May 1808”, for instance,
does not require that one knows the identity of all the persons depicted. What matters in this case, as
suggested by the title, is rather the correct identification of where and when the scene depicted occurs.
An appropriate understanding of this painting surely requires that one treats that event as occurring in
Madrid at the date specified by the title. Likewise, an appropriate understanding of Auguste Renoir’s
“Bal du moulin de la Galette” does not require that the viewer knows the identity of all the persons
depicted. The standard of that painting only requires that one treats that dance as occurring in Paris in
the 1870s. Treating that dance as occurring, say, in Naples in the 1830s would be compatible with the
seeing-in  experience  elicited by that  painting  but  not  with its  standard of  correctness.  In  the  next
section, I will argue that such standard concerning places and times, namely the standpoint-standard, is
specific to the pictorial experience whereas the requirements on kinds and individuals can also apply to
ordinary perception.
2. Standpoints and Features
If one shows me something to see, my response can be evaluated with respect to a sort of standard of
correctness even though mine is an episode of ordinary perception instead of pictorial experience. If
one shows me a lamb over there but I wrongly see it as a dog, my response is inappropriate with
respect to a sort  of kind-standard.  Likewise,  if  one shows me Queen  Elizabeth II  over there but I
mistake her for actress Helen Mirren, my response is inappropriate with respect to a sort of individual-
standard.  In  this  sense,  both  the  kind-standard  and the  individual-standard  can  also  be  applied  to
ordinary perception. Yet, in the latter, the place of the scene we see is here, in front of us, and the time
when it occurs is now, when our very perception is occurring. The pictorial experience, instead, does
not tell us anything about the place in which and the time at which the scene depicted occurs.
On the one hand, ordinary perception warrants that we perceive a certain scene from the standpoint
occupied by our body. Thus, we are automatically informed about the place in which and the time at
which the scene perceived occurs, namely, here (i.e. where our body is) and now (i.e. when our body is
undergoing this experience). On the other hand, pictorial perception provides us with a perspective that
does not correspond to the standpoint currently occupied by our body. Therefore, we need the standard
of  correctness  in  order  to  fix  the  place  and  the  time  of  that  standpoint.  This  is  what  I  call  the
standpoint-standard,  which selects  the correct  spatiotemporal  location of  the scene depicted out  of
possible spatiotemporal locations of it.
In the pictures supplied by surveillance cameras and CCTV systems the standpoint-standard surely play
a key role. An appropriate understanding of what is depicted, indeed, requires that one knows where the
surveillance camera is placed, as well as whether it is recording now or, if not, when it recorded the
scene  depicted.  In  fact,  when  one  watches  the  pictures  provided  by  surveillance  cameras,  the
kind-standard and the individual-standard are as dispensable as they are in ordinary perception,  in
which one can see something moving over there without knowing what it is. However, the standpoint-
standard is indispensable. If one ignores the standpoint-standard, one is not properly understanding the
scene depicted.
The standpoint-standard can also be relevant beyond surveillance cameras and CCTV systems. Digital
cameras  now  typically  include  metadata  specifying  when  and  where  (viz.  date,  time,  longitude,
latitude) a certain photograph was taken. In old analog photographs, a similar role was often played by
the  title.  Consider  Henri  Cartier-Bresson’s  photograph “Juvisy,  France.  1938”,  whose  title  tells  us
where and when the scene depicted is located. The same is true for many paintings. For instance, John
Constable’s “Beaching a Boat, Brighton” has a title that not only provides us with an indication of the
kind of event that we should see in the picture (the beaching of a boat)  but also specifies a place
(Brighton), which one can somehow supplement with a time if one considers the year in which the
painting was made (1824).
In addition to  place and time,  there is  a  third parameter  that  is  crucial  to  the standpoint-standard,
namely world. The latter specifies the spatiotemporal framework to which the relevant place and time
belong. In photographs or in paintings that portray real people and events,  the standpoint-standard
specifies the spatiotemporal framework in which the picture itself, its maker, and its viewers have their
place,  namely,  the actual  world.  Still,  there are  pictures  whose standpoint  is  located in  an alleged
spatiotemporal framework, namely a fictional world, which can do without the picture itself, its maker,
and its viewers. 
For instance, Jacques-Louis David’s “The Death of Marat” and Piero di Cosimo’s “A Satyr Mourning
over a Nymph” depict the same kind of event, namely death, and yet these paintings sharply differ as
regards the standpoint-standard. The former locates the mournful event in the actual world, the latter in
a fictional world. Likewise, in the case of moving pictures, the standpoint-standard draws the boundary
between documentaries, whose standpoints are located in the actual world, and fiction films, which
invite us to enjoy standpoints located in fictional worlds.ii
To sum up,  pictures  invite  us  to  see certain individuals  belonging to  certain kinds  from a certain
standpoint. The standard of correctness tells us who those individuals are, which kinds they belong to,
and which standpoint they have to be seen from. Still, in representing individuals, pictures also endow
them with visual features. Such features are usually  ascribed  to the individuals depicted, but there
might be exceptions. For instance, a black and white photograph endows the depicted individuals with
black and white colors but does not ascribe such colors to them. In other words, the individuals looks
black and white but we are not entitled to conclude that they are so colored. The role of the feature-
standard precisely consists in distinguishing the features that are ascribed to the individuals depicted
from those they are just endowed with.
Pictures such as black and white photographs inherit their feature-standard from the category to which
they belong.  Yet,  there  might  be cases  in  which  a  pictures  has  a  feature-standard of  its  own.  For
instance, the feature-standard of Parmiginanino’s “The Madonna with the Long Neck” establishes that
the length of the neck is not to be ascribed to the Madonna in spite of the fact that she is endowed with
this  feature.  Likewise,  Henri  Matisse’s  “The  Green  Stripe”  has  not  only  an  individual-standard
according to which the person portrayed is Amélie Noellie Matisse-Parayre, the wife of the painter, but
also a feature-standard according to which the green stripe that divides her face in half is not a sort of
birthmark that we should ascribe to her.iii
Just as the individual-standard and the kind-standard, the feature-standard is not specific to pictorial
experience. It can be found also in ordinary perception. When we see things in a room illuminated by a
blue light, for example, we should be aware that those things are not blue even though they looks blue,
just as Madame Matisse’s face it is not green even though it looks green. The standpoint-standard,
instead, as argued above, is unique to pictures.
3. Indeterminacy, Interpretation, and Disagreement
As  said  from  the  beginning,  the  four  categories  that  I  have  highlighted—the  kind-standard,  the
individual-standard,  the feature-standard and the standpoint-standard—are not  aimed to individuate
different standard of correctness but rather different ways in which  the  standard of correctness can
function. In principle, all the four categories can contribute to the standard of correctness of a given
picture.  For  instance,  the  standard  of  “The  Death of  Marat”  mandates  us  to  see,  from a  certain
standpoint  (Paris,  July 13,  1793),  an event  of a certain kind (death)  involving a certain individual
(Marat); moreover, it mandates us to ascribe certain features (the various colors and shapes, but not the
inscriptions in the bedside table) to that scene. 
In sum, the four categories do not individuate four different ways of seeing pictures, but rather four
different ways of supplementing the pictorial experience with non-pictorial information. Thus, I am not
proposing a distinction between pictures in which we ought to see kinds, pictures in which we ought to
see individuals, pictures in which we ought to see features, and pictures in which we ought to see a
scene from a specific standpoint. Pictures usually mandate us to do all these things: we are invited to
see, from a certain standpoint, individuals belonging to kinds and having features. The four different
dimensions of the standard just tells us which is that standpoint, which are those individuals, which are
their kinds, and which features we should ascribe to them. When the standard lacks some of those
dimensions, the corresponding parameter remains indeterminate. For instance, the viewer of “Bal du
moulin de la Galette” can see several individuals but cannot establish who they are. Yet, this does not
mean that the viewer sees kinds instead of individuals. Indeed, she sees individuals in spite of not being
capable to identify them.iv
The standard of correctness of a picture is not to be confused with an interpretation of it. The former
governs the correct understanding of the picture and thus should be shared by all  the viewers.  An
interpretation, instead, can be accepted by some viewers and rejected by others in spite of the fact that
they  all  correctly  understand  the  picture.  One  might  say  that  the  understanding  governed  by the
picture’s standard of correctness constrains possible interpretations just as the visual experience elicited
by  the  picture’s  surface  constrains  possible  understandings.  Thus  people  can  disagree  on  the
interpretation of a picture while agreeing on its standard of correctness.
If the standard leaves some parameters indeterminate, however, disagreement about the standard of
correctness can arise. This happens when the picture’s appearance makes room for a bunch of plausible
understandings but the information available about the picture’s history is not sufficient to select one
out  of  them with certainty.  An interesting  example,  in  this  sense,  is  the philosophical  controversy
surrounding Vincent Van Gogh’s painting “Shoes”, which Martin Heidegger (1964, pp. 662-663) sees
as governed by a kind-standard: “In van Gogh’s painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand.
There is nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong, only an
undefined space. […] A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more”. Meyer Schapiro (1968) criticizes
Heidegger’s stance towards the painting, arguing that Van Gogh was living in town when he painted
those  shoes.  He  thus  proposes  an  alternative  kind-standard,  namely  city-dweller  shoes  instead  of
peasant shoes: “They are the shoes of the artist, by that time a man of the town and city” (Shapiro 1968,
p. 204). Moreover, he introduces a sort of individual-standard, arguing that the shoes depicted belong to
a particular individual, Van Gogh himself.
Schapiro’s criticism of Heidegger is in turn criticized by Jacques Derrida (1987), who argues that, even
if Van Gogh was living in town when he made that painting, this would not entail that he depicted the
shoes of a city-dweller, let alone his own shoes. Indeed, living in town does not prevent a painter from
remembering or imagining peasant shoes, thereby painting them. Derrida (1987, p. 261) also puts into
question the basic kind-standard that both Shapiro and Heidegger presuppose: “For where do they both
—I mean Schapiro on one side, Heidegger on the other—get their certainty that it’s a question here of a
pair of shoes?”. Analyzing the shapes of the shoes, Derrida observes that they are quite similar; in
particular, they seem to be both left shoes. If they really were meant to be so, the kind-standard would
state  that  what  is  depicted  are  two things  both  belonging  to  the  kind  “left  shoes”,  not  one  thing
belonging to the kind “pair of shoes”. Derrida’s (1987, p. 274) conclusion is that, lacking definitive
pieces of evidence, we should limit ourselves to apply the very general kind-standard “shoes” to this
painting: “Quite simply these shoes do not belong, they are neither present nor absent, there are shoes,
period”.
I argue that Derrida’s conclusion is too hasty. He is overlooking the standpoint-standard. These are not
just  “shoes,  period”.  Rather,  these are shoes that exist  in a certain historical context on which the
painting supplies a peculiar standpoint. Specifically, an appropriate experience of the painting requires
that we see them as shoes located somewhere in Western Europe in the 1880s. The fact that we cannot
establish whether  these shoes  constitute  a pair—or whether  they are peasant  shoes  or  city-dweller
shoes, or whether they belong to Van Gogh—does not prevent us from seeing them as shoes belonging
to the historical context in which they were painted. Even in ordinary perception one might perceive
two shoes from a certain standpoint without being able to establish whether they constitute a pair or
not,  whether  they  are  peasant  shoes  or  city-dweller  shoes,  and  to  whom they really  belong.  The
difference is that ordinary perception fixes its standpoint—here and now—on its own, whereas pictorial
experience can do so only if supplemented by the standpoint-standard.
4. The Game of Depiction
One can try to minimize the role of the standard of correctness, as Derrida does, and yet one cannot
give it up completely. Even Derrida’s radical conclusion, “there are shoes, period”, still presupposes a
kind-standard according to which what one sees in this painting belongs to the kind “shoes”. The point
is that the standard of correctness is not just a possible enrichment of our pictorial experience, but
rather a constitutive element of the picture, which reveals itself to be a pair constituted by both a visual
appearance and a standard of correctness.
A constitutive element is not to be confused with a causal factor. The latter just contributes to bring an
entity into existence whereas the former contributes to make that entity what it is. That said, there is a
broad consensus  on the fact  that  a  picture is  constituted  by its  marked surface.  At  most,  scholars
disagree as regards whether the marked surface is to be understood as a material object or rather as an
abstract structure of colors (see Davies 2010, Zeimbekis 2012). One might say that the former option
holds true in the case of paintings and drawings whereas the latter holds true in the case of reproducible
pictures such as art prints and photographs. However, this is not the question that is relevant for my
essay. I’m just assuming that a picture is constituted by its marked surface without taking stance on
whether this is a fully fledged case of material constitution or rather a case of what one might call
“structural constitution”. The question I am interested in is another one: is a picture constituted by
nothing but its marked surface? In what follows, I shall defend a negative answer to this question. I
shall argue that the standard of correctness also is a constitutive element of the picture. Surely, the
standard does not constitute the picture in the same way the marked surface does. As seen above, the
latter  is  a  material  or  structural  constituent  of  the  picture.  The  former,  instead,  is  a  normative
constituent of the picture, namely its constitutive rule. 
The notion of constitutive rule has been introduced in the philosophy of law and in the philosophy of
language to capture cases in which a rule (or a set thereof) does not limit itself to regulate a preexisting
activity but  rather  makes  that  activity what  it  is  (cf.  Rawls,  1955,  Searle  1969,  Williamson 1996,
García-Carpintero forthcoming). The rules that constitute games are paradigmatic in this respect. For
instance, the rules of chess do not limit themselves to regulate a preexisting activity: they makes chess
the game it is.
I argue that depiction also can be understood as a sort of game. Just as the rules of chess govern our use
of  the  chessboard,  the  standard  of  correctness  governs  our  use  of  the  marked  surface.  There  is,
nevertheless, a crucial difference. The structure of the chessboard is the same for all chess matches, and
so are the rules of chess, whereas each picture has its own marked surface and its own standard of
correctness. 
Drawing on Kendall Walton’s (1990, p. 296) notion of “perceptual games of make-believe”, one might
say that there is a general rule of depiction which mandates the viewer to see a scene in the marked
surface.v Yet, the game of depiction is more complex than that. Each picture has its own rule of the
game, namely, its standard of correctness, which mandates us not only to see a scene in the surface but
also to understand that scene in a specific way.
5. Pictures and Images
Constitutive rules, which bring a new activity into existence, are traditionally contrasted with regulative
rules, which just regulate a preexisting activity. One might thus object that the standard of correctness
is not a constitutive rule but only a regulative one: there is a preexisting activity, seeing-in, which can
be regulated by means of the standard of correctness. From this perspective, a picture is nothing but a
marked surface that elicits a seeing-in experience, and the standard of correctness boils down to a
pragmatic mechanism that governs our use of pictures without bearing upon their being.
First of all,  this  objection leads us stress that there are two games that one can play with marked
surfaces. One can either limit oneself to enjoying the seeing-in experience elicited by the surface or one
can aim to  understand the  picture  by taking its  history into account.  I  propose to  call  the former
“image-game” and the latter “picture-game”.vi
That said, my reply to the objection is that the main game we play with marked surfaces in our cultural
practices is the picture-game, not the image-game. In the former game, the standard of correctness does
not limit itself to regulate a preexisting activity. Instead, it constitutes a new activity, the picture-game,
as distinct from the image-game.
The proposed distinction between image-game and picture-game presents an interesting analogy with
David Kaplan’s  (1989) distinction  between the “character”  and the “content”  of  an indexical.vii In
Kaplan’s terms, the pronoun ‘I’ has just one “character” (the person who is speaking, let me assume)
but can have different “contents” depending on the contexts in which it is used. Likewise, I contend, a
marked surface corresponds to just one image-game but can enable different picture-games. However,
in our cultural practices, we do not usually individuate marked surfaces in the way we individuate
indexicals. That is to say that we do not cast marked surfaces as communicative devices that we can use
in different contexts in order to mean different things. We do not deploy the Mona Lisa in the way we
deploy the pronoun ‘I’. The latter is individuated by its character, as one can easily see by checking the
entry ‘I’ in a dictionary. Yet, if one checks the entry ‘Mona Lisa’ in an encyclopedia, one finds not only
a description of its visual appearance but also a careful presentation of its standard of correctness. This
suggests that, from an ontological perspective, depictions, unlike indexicals, are not individuated by
their Kaplanian character (the image-game), but rather by their Kaplanian content (the picture-game). 
The idea that there are two distinct games that we can play with marked surfaces fits well with those
phenomenological or epistemological accounts of depiction according to which there are two different
kinds of things that we can see in a marked surface. For instance, Edmund Husserl (2005) and Lambert
Wiesing (2009) distinguish between the depicted object, which is a mere three-dimensional appearance,
and  the  depicted  subject,  which  is  instead  what  is  “genuinely  meant” (Husserl  2005,  26)  by  the
presentation.  Likewise,  John Haugeland (1991) and John Kulvicki  (2006) distinguish between two
kinds of pictorial  contents, namely,  the “bare-bone content”, which is shared by all the things that
match the appearance elicited by the marked surface, and the “fleshed out content”, which just picks
out what is actually depicted. 
Drawing  on  such  insights,  Bence  Nanay  (2018)  and  Regina-Nino  Mion  (2019)  cast  the  pictorial
experience  as  “threefold”.  Wollheim  (1980)  only  individuates  two  experiential  folds,  namely,  a
configurational fold that represents the marked surface, and a recognitional fold that represents what is
depicted. For Nanay and Mion, instead, the configurational fold is supplemented by two recognitional
folds; one representing the Husserlian object and the other the Husserlian subject. 
However,  I  will  not  take  stance  on  whether  the  pictorial  experience  actually  is  threefold.  The
threefoldness I am interested in is ontological, not phenomenological. This means that there are three
entities at stake in depiction. First, the marked surface as an entity individuated by its structure, just as
a rock or a cloud. Second, the image as an entity individuated by its general function, which consists in
eliciting the experience of a three-dimensional appearance. Third, the picture as an artifact individuated
by its specific function, which consists in eliciting the experience of certain things (of a certain kind,
having certain features,  and seen from a certain standpoint)  that are picked out by the standard of
correctness. In principle, the marked surface, the image and the picture all are ontologically respectable
entities. Yet, if we consider the role that depiction plays in our cultural practices, it is the picture that
matters rather than the image or the marked surface.
The cultural priority of pictures over images becomes especially evident if one notices that, in our
practices, two things can share the same visual appearance and yet be different pictures in virtue of
having different standards of correctness. Let us consider, for example, the case of two pictures, PA and
PB, which portray two twins, A and B, in the same posture on the same background. PA and PB are
numerically distinct in spite of having an identical appearance. The reason is that the standard of PA
casts A as the individual depicted whereas the standard of PB casts B. Therefore, PA and PB are distinct
pictures in spite of sharing the same appearance, that is, of being the same image.
A similar  case can be found in Arthur  Danto’s  (1981, 1)  though experiment about a series of red
squares which constitute distinct works of art in spite of sharing the same appearance. In particular, “a
still-life executed by an embittered disciple of Matisse, called ‘Red Table Cloth’” and “a painting of the
Israelites Crossing the Red Sea” (Danto 1981, 1) are distinct pictures even though they are visually
indiscernible. The ontological consequence of Danto’s thought experiment is that what makes “‘Red
Table Cloth” and “the Israelites Crossing the Red Sea” two distinct pictures cannot be their appearance.
Hence, what constitutes those pictures cannot boil down to their appearance. There must be a hidden,
invisible constituent which—as argued earlier—is the standard of correctness.
6. The Varieties of Depiction
Depending on its standard of correctness, a picture can function in at least three different ways. First, a
picture that only has a kind-standard and a feature-standard just provides us with information about the
features of a certain kind.  The illustrations that one can find in ornithology books are of this sort.
Second, a picture that also has an individual-standard—but lacks a standpoint-standard—provides us
with information about the features of a certain individual regardless of the particular situations in
which that individual might find herself. The photographs included in documents such as passports or
identity cards are of this sort. Third, a picture having not only a kind-standard, a feature-standard and
an individual-standard but also a standpoint-standard provides us with information about what is going
on in a particular place at a particular time. The pictures provided by surveillance cameras and CCTV
systems are of this sort.
The latter variety of depiction provides us with an experience which is close to ordinary perception
inasmuch as it concerns particular individuals in particular circumstances, just as ordinary perception
does. The former varieties of depiction, instead, are somehow intermediate between perception and
conceptual thought (or language). Specifically, a picture such as a passport photograph, which has an
individual-standard but lacks a standpoint-standard, provides us with a visual analogous of individual
concepts  (or  proper  nouns).  And a picture  such as  those in  ornithology books,  which has  a  kind-
standard but lacks a standpoint-standard, provides us with a visual analogous of generic concepts (or
common nouns). 
Even  though  some  pictures  may  lack  an  individual-standard  and  a  standpoint-standard,  the  kind-
standard seems to remain an indispensable constituent of the vast majority of pictures. Indeed, one
finds  it  hard  to  conceive  of  a  picture  to  which  no  kind-standard  applies.  Perhaps  some  abstract
paintings such as those by Joan Miro, Yves Tanguy, Paul Klee or Wassily Kandinski are of this sort. We
just see things with certain shapes and colors but we do not know what kinds they belong to. Yet, in
such cases, one might wonder if these pictures really depict something, i.e. these really are pictures and
not just mere images such as those of Rorschach tests (see Wollheim 1980, p. 138). Thus, one is faced
with two alternatives.
If one denies that abstract paintings are  pictures, these cannot count as counterexamples to the claim
that  pictures are constituted not only by a marked surface but also by a standard of correctness. For
instance, according to Walton’s account of nonfigurative art (1990, pp. 54-57)—inspired by Wollheim’s
(1974)—a work such as  Kasimir Malevich’s  Suprematist  Painting is an image since we can see a
three-dimensional appearance in its two-dimensional surface, but it is not a picture since our experience
of that appearance is not supplemented by anything.viii
On the other hand, if one treats abstract paintings as pictures, one is at least committed to the claim that
these provide us with a perspective on a world different from ours, a world inhabited by individuals
whose kinds we completely ignore.  In this  case,  such pictures have at  least  a standpoint-standard,
which prescribes us to treat what we see as occurring in a world that is different from the actual one. 
At the end of the day, I do not intend to take stance on which option is the right one—I suspect that the
answer depends in which particular abstract painting we are considering. I limit myself to pointing out
that  the  proposed  distinction  between  image-game  and  picture-game  enables  us  to  highlight  two
different  ways—both  aesthetically  valuable,  I  would  say—in  which  a  viewer  might  engage  with
abstract paintings.
7. The Secret Life of Pictures
That something cannot be seen does not mean that it  does not exist.  If we conceive of pictures as
artifacts  whose functions consist  in eliciting an  appropriate experience from a suitable viewer,  we
should  acknowledge  that  a  picture  is  constituted  not  only  by  a  visible  component,  namely  its
appearance, but also by a hidden component, namely its standard of correctness. Unlike the picture’s
appearance, which has its place in front of the viewer, the standard lacks a precise location in space,
even though it has a beginning in time. The standard is not a visible thing but rather a norm that
remains implicit in practice, and can be made explicit by means of texts such as titles, labels, catalogs,
encyclopedia entries, or essays in art history. In principle, this norm is determined by the intentions of
the maker of the picture or by the causal mechanism that produced it, depending on whether the picture
is handmade or not. 
Still, I contend, the standard of correctness that is actually in force for a picture—in a certain historical
period, within a certain cultural community—depends on the pieces of information possessed and by
the attitudes adopted by the members of that community. If detailed information about the intentions of
the maker or the circumstances of the relevant causal process is no longer available, the standard of
correctness can be redefined by the members of the relevant community on the basis of the pieces of
evidence that are at their disposal. What happens in such cases is the realistic version of a thought
experiment suggested by Michael Newall (2011a, 4): “Imagine a community in which painters put their
images to a popular vote in order to determine their meaning. Voters would be required to consider the
various items that they find that each picture surface can occasion a visual experience or recognition of,
and then choose one of these and write its name on a ballot. The picture’s subject matter is then the
item with the most votes”.
Newall (2011a, 4) treats this hypothesis as a merely theoretical conjecture, arguing that “To do away
with a standard of correctness based on intention would be to make pictures much less useful to us.
Understandably, this function is something that no culture that makes use of images appears to have
sacrificed”.  Yet,  it  is  a  fact  that  there  are  pictures  for  which  reliable  information  on the  makers’
intentions (or on the circumstances of the relevant causal processes) is no longer available. If we want
to provide these pictures with standards of correctness on the basis of the few pieces of evidence that
we possess, we should resort to some procedures of the sort imagined by Newall. Although we do not
write our preferences on a ballot thereby selecting the standard of correctness with the most votes, we
rely on an implicit negotiation that proceeds along similar lines and pursuits the same purpose. ix The
above mentioned debate on the shoes painted by Van Gogh can be seen as a negotiation of this sort. 
This leads us to stress the key role that art historians and art theorists play in the enforcement of the
standard  of  correctness:  they  are  the  epistemic  authorities  to  whom we  defer  the  researches  and
negotiations  aimed  at  establishing  the  standards  of  correctness  of  the  pictures  we  live  with.x For
instance, the discipline that Erwin Panofsky (1955) calls “iconography” can improve our understanding
and appreciation of pictures by highlighting their standard of correctness.
As the outcome of a negotiation, the standard of correctness rests upon the attitudes of the member of
the relevant cultural community, as well as on the documents that have recorded them. If such attitudes
and documents change, the standard of correctness changes in turn, and so does the picture that is
constituted by it. This is not surprising, if we acknowledge that the standard of correctness is a public
norm, and public norms can change over time, just as juridical laws do. Although, from an axiological
perspective, we must consider the lost original standard of a certain picture more valuable—in virtue of
its  connection  to  the  maker’s  intentions—than  the  one  in  force  nowadays,  from  an  ontological
perspective the  norm that  actually constitutes  the picture-game is  the one currently in  force,  even
though it is different from the original one.
8. Conclusion
Pictures can change in both their  constitutive components. Just  as the appearance of a picture can
change as a consequence of changes of its material supports, the standard of correctness can change as
a consequence of changes in the information possessed and in the attitudes adopted by the members of
the relevant community.
In principle, the standard of correctness of a picture is easier to preserve than its visual appearance,
since the former can be easily recorded in written documents whereas the latter may be embodied in
delicate material objects such as painted canvas. However, the fact that the standard of correctness is an
invisible component of a picture that usually remains implicit in practice can lead people to take it for
granted thereby overlooking the possibility of losing it as time goes by. That being the case, a proper
preservation of a picture should involve taking care not only of its visual appearance but also of its
standard of  correctness.  In this  sense,  the art  restorer  and the art  historian participate  to  the same
enterprise, namely, preserving a picture. While the restorer takes care of the visual appearance of a
picture, the historian takes care of its standard of correctness.
What holds true for preservation also applies to appreciation. As Nelson  Goodman (1968, 111–112)
aptly points out: “The aesthetic properties of a picture include not only those found by looking at it but
also those that determine how it is to be looked at. This rather obvious fact would hardly have needed
underlining but for the prevalence of the time-honored Tingle-Immersion theory, which tells us that the
proper behaviour on encountering a work of art is to strip ourselves of all vestments of knowledge and
experience  (since  they  might  blunt  the  immediacy  of  our  enjoyment),  then  submerge  ourselves
completely and gauge the aesthetic potency of the work by the intensity and duration of the resulting
tingle. The theory is absurd on the face of it and useless for dealing with any important problems of
aesthetics; but it has become part of the fabric of our common nonsense”.
If one considers the behavior and listens to the comments of the visitors of a gallery, one can notice that
—half a century after the time when Goodman wrote these lines— the “Tingle-Immersion theory” still
has a significant quantity of followers. In particular, it is quite common, when one visits an art gallery,
to encounter visitors who are limiting themselves to looking at paintings, without caring at all about the
standard of correctness. If what I have argued in this paper is right, such visitors fail in having an
appropriate appreciation of the paintings they see. They mistake picture for images, thereby playing the
wrong game in spite of being in front of the right chessboard. Surely art scholars are the most apt
subjects  to  prevent  such  regrettable  misunderstanding  inasmuch  as  they  are  in  charge  of  the
preservation and communication of the standard of correctness. Still, philosophers also can contribute
to improve our cultural practices involving pictures by showing how crucial the standard of correctness
is to them. This is what I have tried to do in this paper.
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